Denver Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys

Article 26

January 1991

Environmental
Denver University Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Denver University Law Review, Environmental, 68 Denv. U. L. Rev. 689 (1991).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

ENVIRONMENTAL

Hackney, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 895 F.2d 1298
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Hackney, Inc. ("Hackney"), appealed a decision and order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the
"Commission") which held that Hackney committed "nonserious" violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The enforcement action and subsequent Commission order arose out of an
inspection by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") of a workplace operated by Hackney. On appeal, Hackney
argued that: (1) the search warrant for the inspection was unconstitutional; and (2) the "nonserious" violations should have been designated
as de minimus.
First, the Tenth Circuit found that Hackney's challenge to the constitutionality of the search warrant was based on the neutrality of
OSHA's inspection plan as applied. Hackney sought discovery of facts
concerning the plan in order to prove it was not neutral as applied. The
court restricted Hackney's challenge based on the "four corners doctrine" which limits challenges to the validity of search warrants to review
of materials submitted to the magistrate. Because the court found no
evidence meeting the "four corners doctrine," it affirmed the Commission's order precluding discovery. Furthermore, the court found that
because Hackney did not make a preliminary showing of discriminatory
application of OSHA's inspection plan, the Commission's denial of discovery or an evidentiary hearing directed toward an attack on the search
warrant was also proper. Finally, the court held that substantial evidence supported the Commission's determination that the violations
were "nonserious" rather than de minimus.
Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendants, Idarado Mining Company ("Idarado"), Newmont Mining Corporation, and Newmont Services Ltd. ("Newmont"), appealed a
mandatory injunction issued under CERCLA. This injunction required
them to carry out an extensive cleanup plan created by the State of Colorado ("State") including liability for permanent relocation of trailer
park residents, and for cleanup of both Red Mountain Creek and certain
mine portals. Idarado and Newmont also appealed the district court's
finding that Newmont was an owner and operator of Idarado's facilities,
and that the State's plan was not inconsistent with the national contingency plan ("NCP").
The Tenth Circuit decided, for reasons of judicial efficiency and
lack of finality, that only two issues were ripe for appeal: (1) whether
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the State could seek an injunction to enforce its plan under CERCLA;
and (2) whether CERCLA empowers the State to impose relocation expenses upon responsible parties. The court held that the 1986 SARA
amendments to CERCLA do not empower the states to seek such injunctive relief against responsible parties. The court explained that such
a holding would amount to a grant ofjudicial legislation which is inconsistent with § 106 of CERCLA, and with the statute as a whole. The
court further held that although the federal government is so empowered under CERCLA, the statute does not empower the states to impose
liability for permanent relocation.
Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. King, 906 F.2d 1477
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque (the "Village"),
brought suit against certain officials in the federal highway administration ("FHWA"), the city of Albuquerque, and the county of Bernalillo.
The Village brought suit when two bridges were proposed to be built.
The Village was concerned with the effects that the projects would have
on the environment of their community. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Village appealed
on four grounds: (1) the construction of the Montano bridge was a major federal action subject to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"); (2) alternatively, the bridge construction
was improperly segmented from another major federal action; (3) the
construction of the bridge required compliance with § 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"); and (4) the construction of
the bridge required compliance with § 4(o of the Department of Transportation Act ("DTA").
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court first ruled that the construction of the Montano bridge was not a
major federal action subject to the requirements of NEPA. The court
reasoned that there was not sufficient participation on the part of the
federal government for the project to become a major federal action.
Thus, requirements of the NEPA did not apply. Second, the court ruled
that the bridge project and the neighboring major federal action were
only peripherally related and, therefore, properly segmented. Finally,
the court found that the NHPA and the DTA only applied to federal
actions. Since the bridge project was not a federal action, the court
found the statutes inapplicable to the bridge project.

EVIDENCE

Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428
Per Curiam
Defendant, EMS Helicopter, Incorporated ("EMS") and Zimmer,
appealed jury verdicts in favor of plaintiff, Dugan, for compensatory and
punitive damages arising out of a fatal helicopter crash. On appeal,
EMS asserted: (1) there was insufficient evidence to submit to the jury
the issues of Zimmer's liability and punitive damages against EMS; and
(2) the district court erred in not admitting into evidence a complaint
Dugan filed against different defendants which arose out of the same
crash.
First, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a motion for directed verdict on the issues of Zimmer's liability and punitive
damages against EMS. The court explained that the situation presented
a classic example of a jury determination based on sharply disputed evidence. Accordingly, the jury's conclusion was not disturbed on appeal.
Moreover, there was sufficient evidence of gross misconduct to present
the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Second, the court held that
the district court erred in not admitting the complaint which Dugan filed
against different defendants. Because the complaint alleged facts which
were directly inconsistent with positions Dugan argued at trial, the complaint was admissable as an admission against interest pursuant to Fed.
R. Evid. 801(d)(2). This conclusion, however, did not end the court's
analysis. The court stated that the ultimate decision whether to admit or
exclude the ancillary complaint requires balancing under Fed. R. Evid.
403. Using this balancing analysis the court stated that the district
court's failure to allow the complaint's introduction was reversible error.
The court explained the complaint was: (1) highly relevant to the allocation of fault; (2) directly relevant to the issue of punitive damages;
and (3) relevant for impeachment. The case was, therefore, reversed
and remanded to the district court for a new trial.
United States v. Hill, 901 F.2d 880
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Hill, was convicted on several counts of possession and
distribution of cocaine. In his joint trial with co-defendant, Lux, the district court permitted the government to testify about statements made
by Lux prior to trial which incriminated Hill as a drug dealer. Hill appealed, arguing the district court erred by admitting the hearsay statements of his nontestifying co-defendant.
The Tenth Circuit held that the admission of the co-defendant's
prior statements incriminating Hill as a drug dealer violated his sixth
amendment right to confront his accuser. The court reasoned that Hill
could not exercise his right to cross-examination where the accuser was
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a co-defendant who refused to testify at trial. The error required reversal unless the admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Here, the government's other evidence against Hill, while substantial,
was not so overwhelming that the co-defendant's statements regarding
Hill's drug trafficking did not have a probable impact on the jury.
Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470
Per Curiam
Defendant, Caterpillar Tractor Company ("Caterpillar"), petitioned
for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing en banc. Caterpillar argued
that the district court erred when it allowed into evidence remedial actions previously taken by Caterpillar. In particular, Caterpillar alleged
that the district court violated Fed. R. Evid. 407 ("Rule 407"), which
prohibits admission of subsequent remedial measures.
The Tenth Circuit denied the request for a hearing en banc, explaining that no new reason for reconsideration was presented. The court
stated that the remedial action taken by Caterpillar was not a subsequent
measure after the accident in question, but rather, was chronologically
undisputed as having taken place prior to the accident. The court explained that pursuant to Rule 407, evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is inadmissable if they occur after the accident or injury, not
after the time of manufacture of the product or creation of the hazard.
In the case at hand, the court stated that Caterpillar's change in product
design occurred before the accident involving Huffman, regardless of
whether the measure occurred when design work began or when it was
first implemented.
United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Ryans, moved to suppress evidence of tape recordings
which were played in his criminal proceeding. Ryans stated that the recordings contained statements made to a government informant after he
retained counsel. Consequently, Ryans argued that the government violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 7(104)(A)(1), by improperly causing an informant to communicate with him after retention
of counsel. The district court granted Ryans's motion, and the government appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, ruling that Rule 7 was inapplicable to
the investigative phase of law enforcement. In contemplating an adversarial relationship between litigants, the rule's proscriptions do not attach during the investigative process, and before the initiation of
criminal proceedings. Since Ryans had not yet been indicted at the time
the tapes were made, Rule 7 was not violated.

